The Alien Tort Statute from the Perspective of Federal Court Procedure by Drobak, John N.
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 3 The Legal Challenges of Globalization: A View from the Heartland (Symposium Edition) 
2014 
The Alien Tort Statute from the Perspective of Federal Court 
Procedure 
John N. Drobak 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Common Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts 
Commons, International Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John N. Drobak, The Alien Tort Statute from the Perspective of Federal Court Procedure, 13 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 421 (2014), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
421 
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF FEDERAL COURT 
PROCEDURE 
JOHN N. DROBAK

 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has generated considerable controversy 
since its rebirth a little more than 30 years ago.
1
 The Supreme Court did 
not give any guidance to the lower courts until two recent decisions. In 
2004, the Court first took up the Statute in Sosa v. Alverez-Machain,
2
 in 
which it clarified the source of the governing law and explained the types 
of conduct that were actionable under the Statute. Then, in 2013, the Court 
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
3
 examined the need for some type 
of connection with the United States as a condition for suit under the 
Statute. While these cases made it more difficult to sue under the ATS, 
they also resolved some of the controversy over the Statute. 
Notwithstanding the guidance from the Court, the opinions themselves 
raise new issues and leave unresolved some of the other issues relevant to 
ATS litigation.  
This Article will examine a number of procedural issues relevant to the 
Alien Tort Statute, focusing on what the Supreme Court has resolved and 
what remains open for future litigation. It will analyze the constitutional 
basis for the Statute and explain how the law of nations, as part of federal 
common law, established the decision rules for ATS litigation. Then it will 
examine the meaning of the territoriality limitation imposed by Kiobel in 
the context of the Court’s established practice of interpreting jurisdictional 
statutes narrowly. After looking at the relevance of recent changes in 
personal jurisdiction law for ATS suits, the Article will examine statutes 
of limitations and tolling rules, forum non conveniens, exhaustion of 
 
 
  George A. Madill Professor of Law and Professor of Economics and of Political Economy, 
Washington University. The author would like to thank Leila Sadat, Michael J. Kelly, and the 
participants at the conference on Legal Challenges of Globalization: A View from the Heartland, held 
at Washington University on September 19–21, 2013, for their helpful comments. The author also 
appreciates the assistance of his research assistants, Ellesse Henderson and W. Kennedy Comer Jr. 
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 1.  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d. 876 (2d Cir. 1980). “Although the Alien Tort Statute 
has been in existence for over two hundred years, it was an insignificant source of federal court 
jurisdiction during most of its history. Before, 1980, jurisdiction had been upheld under this Statute in 
two reported cases, one in 1795 and the other in 1961.” Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and 
Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 588 (2002). 
 2.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 3.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 12, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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remedies, and comity. It will conclude with consideration of the issues that 
remain to be answered by future litigation under the Statute.  
I. ATS AS JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE AND THE COMMON LAW’S 
INCORPORATION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Every first-year law student learns that federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction. That statement is true today, but it had much more 
meaning at the time of the founding of the United States. In the late 
eighteenth century, state trial courts were viewed as the “courts of general 
jurisdiction” that would do most of the legwork for all kinds of litigation. 
The Framers of the Constitution could not agree on whether to create 
federal trial courts, with some delegates supporting only federal appellate 
jurisdiction in a supreme court and leaving all federal litigation to the state 
trial courts.
4
 The famous Madisonian Compromise left that decision to the 
first Congress. As a result, Article III of the Constitution, which created 
the federal courts, says that “[t]he judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”5  
Congress took little time to resolve that compromise. In the first 
Judiciary Act (of 1789), it created federal trial courts but gave them 
limited jurisdiction. Since navigation along the coast and in interstate 
waters was so important to the economy of a unified country, the federal 
courts were given jurisdiction over admiralty matters. There were a few 
federal crimes created, so federal courts were given jurisdiction to hear 
them. The Framers were concerned about provincialism in the new States, 
made even more likely through the use of local juries, so Article III 
contained specific grants of jurisdiction in federal courts to try to minimize 
discrimination against out-of-staters.
6
 British creditors were worried that 
they would be unable to collect their debts in the aftermath of the 
Revolutionary War, so the Treaty of Peace ending the war contained a 
 
 
 4. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7–9 (6th ed. 2009); Michael G. Collins, Article III, State Court Duties, and the 
Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 58 & n.47; Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to 
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STANFORD L. 
REV. 895, 912 (1984). 
 5.  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. 
 6. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 4, at 1356–57; John N. 
Drobak, Credible Commitment in the United States: Substantive and Structural Limits on the 
Avoidance of Public Debt, in FRONTIERS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 247, 257–58 (John 
N. Drobak and John V.C. Nye eds., 1997). 
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provision requiring the federal government to assure impartial litigation of 
the rights of the British.
7
 As a result, Article III expressly authorized the 
federal courts to hear disputes between an alien and a citizen of a state 
(“alienage” jurisdiction). Also reflecting this concern for in-state bias, 
Article III contained a provision for diversity jurisdiction covering suits 
between citizens of different states. Both of these provisions led to the first 
Congress creating alienage and diversity jurisdiction in the federal trial 
courts. The first Judiciary Act did not, however, create jurisdiction in the 
federal trial courts for the entire scope of federal court jurisdiction listed in 
Article III. For example, federal trial court jurisdiction over cases 
involving federal statues (federal question jurisdiction) did not exist until 
1875; those types of cases were left to the state courts.
8
 The jurisdiction of 
the federal courts and its business was so light that the first Chief Justice, 
John Jay, resigned out of boredom to run for Congress. 
It was in this era of tightly limited federal jurisdiction and concern for 
discrimination against out-siders that the Alien Tort Statue was born. 
Although there is some disagreement over the first Congress’s reasons for 
enacting the statute,
9
 the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
10
 
accepted the general consensus that Congress was responding to recent 
incidents involving affronts to foreign diplomats in the United States.
11
 
 
 
 7. The Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, art. IV, 8 Stat. 80, 82; See OLIVER W. HOLMES DEVISE 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 xx (Julius Goebel, Jr. 
ed., 1971); Patrick Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and 
the Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEXAS L.REV. 72, 92–94 (1993). 
 8.  There was a brief period when federal courts had federal question jurisdiction in the early 
19th century. See Judiciary Act of 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 89. Also known as the “Midnight Judges Act,” 
the Judiciary Act of 1801 was repealed by the Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 156. 
 9.  See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 637–45. 
 10.  See supra note 2. 
 11.  In 1784, a Frenchman verbally and physically assaulted French Consul General and Secretary 
of the French Legion Francis Barbe-Marbois in Philadelphia causing tension with France, which 
expressed displeasure over the Continental Congress’s inability to address the matter. The French 
Minister protested to the Continental Congress and threatened to leave unless there was an adequate 
remedy provided. The incident prompted Congress to draft a resolution asking the states to allow suits 
in tort for the violation of law of nations, but few states enacted such a provision, which was another 
example of states’ hostility towards foreigners. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania eventually upheld 
the attacker’s conviction for violating the law of nations. See supra note 3, at 1666.  
 Another incident that has been connected to the creation of the ATS happened in 1787 when a 
New York police officer arrested a servant of the Dutch ambassador in the ambassador’s home, which 
was in violation of the diplomatic immunity attached to the property. The Dutch ambassador 
complained about the incident, which led the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request that Mayor of 
New York, John Jay, have the police officer arrested. Jay wrote back to the Secretary with caution 
stating, “neither Congress nor our [state] Legislature have yet passed any act respecting a breach of the 
privileges of Ambassadors.” The police officer eventually was convicted of a crime and sentenced to 
three months of imprisonment. Id. at 1666–67 (citing Bradley, supra note 1, at 641–42). See also U.S. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Alien Tort Statute opened up a federal forum for these types of 
disputes between non-citizens. 
The original version of the Statute gave the federal district courts 
“cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the 
[federal] circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien 
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”12 If this statute were enacted today as a stand-alone 
provision, it would be interpreted as doing two things: creating a federal 
forum and also creating a federal cause of action. The cause of action 
would be a statutory tort based on a violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty. This interpretation would avoid the controversial questions that 
involve the extent of federal common law today in the aftermath of Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
13
 because the cause of action would be a 
statutory one (based on the law of nations) rather than a common law one. 
However, in 1789, the law of nations was viewed as part of the common 
law applicable throughout the United States. It is well accepted that the 
clause created only jurisdiction in the federal courts and that the cause of 
action came from the common law and its incorporation of the law of 
nations.
14
 In Sosa, the Court quoted a commentator for the proposition that 
it would be “simply frivolous” to consider the ATS as creating a statutory 
cause of action.
15
 The late eighteenth century was a time when the 
common law created and defined most rights, as the age of statutory rights 
was decades away.
16
 In addition, the location of the initial ATS as a clause 
in a lengthy statute defining federal court jurisdiction of many types also 
supports the conclusion that it was only jurisdictional.
17
 
If the Alien Tort Statute were used by an alien to sue another alien, the 
only clause in Article III of the Constitution that would allow federal court 
 
 
DEP’T OF STATE, THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 443 
(1837); 34 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 24–25 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1937) (Feb. 1, 1788). 
 12.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §. 9, 1 Stat. 77 (1789). 
 13.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739–46 (Scalia, J., concurring); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 
513 (2002). 
 14. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 (“The fact that the ATS was placed in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute 
otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court jurisdiction, is itself support for its strictly 
jurisdictional nature.”). 
 15.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 (quoting Castro, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over 
Torts Committed in violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986)). 
 16. The first uniform laws in the United States were drafted at the turn of the 20th Century. The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the Uniform Negotiable 
Instruments Act in 1896 and the Uniform Sales Act in 1906. See Amasa M. Eaton, The Negotiable 
Instruments Law: Its History and Practical Operations, 2 MICH. L. REV. 260 (1904). 
 17. See supra note 14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/6
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jurisdiction is the “arising under” clause, which allows jurisdiction for 
suits arising under federal law.
18
 An ATS suit arises under federal law 
because the Statute provides for suits governed by federal common law 
since the law of nations was then and is now part of federal common law. 
If one were to interpret the Statute as invoking the law of nations directly 
rather than through federal common law, there would be no authorization 
for federal court jurisdiction under Article III. As the Statute is 
constitutional, it allows jurisdiction for a federal common law cause of 
action, based on the law of nations.
19
 
Besides resolving the source of federal authority for the ATS, Sosa 
clarified the kinds of suits that were within ATS jurisdiction. Relying on 
Blackstone, the Court noted that three types of suits would have been 
within the law of nations in 1789: offenses against ambassadors, violations 
of safe conduct, and price capture and piracy.
20
 However, the Statute was 
not locked into only these three kinds of suits. The Court wrote: 
We think it correct, then, to assume that the First Congress 
understood that the district courts would recognize private causes of 
action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations, though we 
found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind 
beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary 
offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too, that no development in 
the two centuries from the enactment of section 1350 to the birth of 
the modern line of cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d 876 (C.A. 2 1980), has categorically precluded federal courts 
from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of 
common law. Congress has not in any way amended section 1350 
or limited civil common law power by another statute. Still, there 
are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a 
 
 
 18.  “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
authority . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. If an alien sued a U.S. citizen, alienage jurisdiction would 
be proper. 
 19.  This analysis answers the question of “how to conceptualize the applicable law in ATS suits 
and, more specifically, whether courts apply international law directly or some form of U.S. common 
law that may or may not reflect international norms.” Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the 
Distinction between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65, 65. Curtis 
Bradley has argued that the First Congress intended the Alien Tort Statute to permit suits by aliens 
against only U.S. citizens, which would fall within the alienage jurisdiction of Article III. Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 591 (2002). Regardless of the 
original meaning, it well established today that the Statute allows suits by an alien again an alien.  
 20.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715, 720, 724. 
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federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of 
this kind. Accordingly, we think courts should require any claim 
based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with specificity comparable to the features of the 18th century 
paradigms we have recognized.
21
  
Thus the Court left for another day the identification of new causes of 
action that are based on a norm that is universally accepted and defined 
with the requisite specificity, although it noted with approval the comment 
in Filartiga that the torturer is the modern-day equivalent of the pirate.
22
 
II. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Kiobel’s contribution to our understanding of the Alien Tort Statute is 
its answer to the question of “[w]hether and under what circumstances the 
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the 
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the 
United States.”23 Relying on a canon of statutory interpretation that creates 
a presumption against the extraterritorial application of a regulatory 
statute, the Court ruled that the claim in an ATS case must “touch and 
concern” the territory of the United States with “sufficient force to 
displace the presumption of extraterritorial applications.”24 This holding 
surely troubles those who prefer that the federal courts provide remedies 
for atrocities that occur outside our territory.
25
 Nonetheless, this limitation 
on the reach of the ATS is justified by a number of factors.  
First, there is historical support for this conclusion. The two incidents 
that contributed to the enactment of the Act both occurred in the United 
States.
26
 Plus, the two earliest cases applying the Act shortly after its 
enactment, involved events within the territory of the United States. One 
case concerned the wrongful seizure of slaves while in port in South 
Carolina,
27
 while the other involved the wrongful seizure of a ship in U.S. 
 
 
 21.  Id. at 724–25. 
 22.  Id. at 732. 
 23.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. 
 24.  Id. at 1669. 
 25. Since the decision in Kiobel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the precedent 
to dismiss a long-running ATS case in Balintulo, et al. v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013). 
One commentator concluded that “ATS litigation is thus transformed by Kiobel, but the ATS is by no 
means dead.” Kenneth Anderson, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Alien Tort Statute’s 
Jurisdictional Universalism in Retreat, 12 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 149, 183 (2012–13).  
 26.  See supra note 5. 
 27.  Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/6
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territorial waters that then docked in the port of Philadelphia.
28
 The Court 
also noted an incident in which United States citizens participated in an 
attack on the British colony of Sierra Leone.
29
 In response to a protest by 
the British Ambassador, the Attorney General rendered an opinion 
indicating that U.S. citizens who participated “in an attack taking place 
both on the high seas and on a foreign shore” could be sued under the ATS 
in a federal court for a tort. The Attorney General based the jurisdiction on 
the violation of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain.
30
 
Therefore the Act’s early history demonstrates that it was used for 
incidents occurring in the territory of the United States or incidents 
elsewhere involving U.S. citizens. As the Court wrote, “Nothing about this 
historical context suggests that Congress also intended federal common 
law under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in 
the territory of another sovereign.”31 
The Court’s opinions in both Sosa and Kiobel express concerns about 
the federal courts infringing upon the sovereignty of other nations for 
political and practical reasons. As the Court instructed in Kiobel, it would 
prefer to avoid “diplomatic strife.”32 By relying on a presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the Court essentially deferred to Congress to expand the 
reach of the Alien Tort Statute. This type of restrained approach for the 
courts is consistent with the relative roles of the three branches of 
government. In addition, the territorial limitation on the reach of the ATS 
is consistent with the territorial limitations on the reach of U.S. regulatory 
laws. 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.,
33
 a case relied on in 
Kiobel,
34
 the Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in a 
suit brought by foreign investors against an Australian bank for securities 
fraud in foreign transactions. The plaintiffs sued the bank for alleged 
violations of U.S. securities laws for conduct that occurred as part of the 
mortgage fiasco that lead to the financial crisis of 2008. The bank owned a 
mortgage-servicing company in Florida, which generated considerable 
income for the bank for a number of years. However, in 2001, the bank 
 
 
 28.  Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Penn. 1793) 
 29.  In 1794, a French fleet, led by an American slave trader with a grudge, plundered the British 
colony of Sierra Leone. The British sought resolution from the United States since an American led the 
attack. C. FYFE, A HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE 59–61 (1962). 
 30.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668. 
 31.  Id. at 1668–69. 
 32.  Id. at 1669. 
 33.  501 U.S. 247, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 34.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661. 
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wrote down the value of the servicing company’s assets by over $2 billion, 
causing the price of the bank’s Ordinary Shares, the Australian equivalent 
of common stock, to slump. The plaintiffs claimed that the bank had 
manipulated financial models in order to inflate the servicing company’s 
assets to appear more valuable than they really were. The plaintiffs were 
Australian investors who had bought the Ordinary Shares before the write-
down. The bank’s Ordinary Shares are traded on the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited and on other foreign exchanges, but not on any 
exchange in the United States. However, the bank’s “American Depository 
Receipts” (which represent the right to receive a specific number of 
Ordinary Shares) are listed on the New York Stock Exchange.
35
 
Applying the presumption against extraterritorial application, the Court 
found no indication that SEC rule 10(b)(5), the basis of the plaintiffs’ suit, 
was intended to reach conduct outside the United States. Nonetheless, the 
plaintiffs argued that their suit involved domestic application of the law 
because “Florida is where [the servicing company] and its senior 
executives engaged in the deceptive conduct of manipulating [the 
company’s] financial models [and its senior executives] made misleading 
public statements there.”36 The Court’s rejection of that argument is an 
important lesson for those trying to use the Alien Tort Statute.  
The Court in Kiobel ended its opinion with this admonition: 
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application. See Morrison, 561 
U.S. ___ (slip op. at 17–24). Corporations are often present in many 
countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate 
presence suffices.
37
  
Thus the facts and holding of Morrison are a useful lesson about the types 
of connections with the United States that may be present in a lawsuit but 
still not overcome the extraterritorial presumption.  
 
 
 35.  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76. 
 36.  Id. at 2883–84. 
 37.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
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In rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument on domestic application of the 
securities law in Morrison, the Court wrote: 
[I]t is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks 
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the 
presumption of extraterritorial application would be a craven 
watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some 
domestic activity is involved in the case. The concurrence seems to 
imagine such a timid sentinel . . . but our cases are to the contrary. 
In [EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)], for 
example, the Title VII plaintiff had been hired in Houston, and was 
an American citizen . . . The Court concluded, however, that neither 
that territorial event nor that relationship was the “focus” of 
congressional concern, . . . but rather domestic employment . . . 
 Applying the same mode of analysis here, we think that the 
focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where the 
deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in 
the United States. Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, 
but only deceptive conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered.”. . . Those purchase-and-sale transactions 
are the objects of the statute’s solicitude. It is those transactions that 
the statute seeks to “regulate.” 
 . . . . 
 Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security listed on an American stock exchange, and the 
purchase or sale of any other security in the United States. This case 
involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects 
of the purchase complained of by those petitioners who still have 
live claims occurred outside the United States.
38
  
 
 
 38.  130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2888 (citations omitted). In addition to the limits on the territorial reach of 
the securities and employment discrimination laws, the Supreme Court has limited the territorial reach 
of the Sherman Act. As international commerce expanded after World War II, the federal courts 
interpreted the Sherman Act to reach foreign firms that conspired abroad only when their actions 
affected U.S. commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 
1945). Congress codified this “effects test” in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982. 
In F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Empagram S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the Court interpreted an ambiguous 
provision in the Act as to not permit a suit by a foreign firm injured overseas by foreign 
anticompetitive conduct even when the conduct would justify a suit for injuries suffered in the U.S. In 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Both Morrison and Arabian American Oil Co. demonstrate that ATS 
plaintiffs will need to identify the “focus” of the litigation, i.e., where did 
the conduct occur that allegedly violates the law of nations? Ancillary 
connections with the United States are not relevant. In Kiobel, the 
defendants’ sale of their stock on the New York Stock Exchange and their 
operation of an office in New York used to explain their business to 
potential investors was not the conduct regulated by the law of nations.
39
 
That occurred in Nigeria.  
Some commentators have criticized the Court’s reliance in Kiobel on a 
presumption against extraterritoriality that had been used for regulatory 
statutes, but not for jurisdictional ones. The Court acknowledged the 
pedigree of the presumption and explained its use for a jurisdictional 
statute as follows: 
We typically apply the presumption to discern whether an Act of 
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad. The ATS, on the other 
hand, is “strictly jurisdictional.” It does not regulate conduct or 
afford relief. It instead allows federal courts to recognize certain 
causes of action based on sufficiently defined norms of international 
law. But we think the principles underlying the canon of 
interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action 
that may be brought under the ATS.
40
 
It is important to remember that the Supreme Court has for over 200 years 
interpreted grants of jurisdiction narrowly. One well-known example is the 
requirement of complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1332, even though 
identical words in Article III allow for minimal diversity. The Court 
prefers to defer to Congress on the reach of federal judicial power. 
Because the Alien Tort Act is merely a jurisdictional statute, not a statute 
creating substantive rights, it is difficult to criticize the Court for 
abdicating a role in punishing evil wrongdoers throughout the world. As 
with all jurisdictional statutes, it is up to Congress to expand the reach of 
the federal courts.  
 
 
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed concern for comity and for not interfering with a foreign 
nation’s ability to regulate its own commercial affairs.  
 39.  Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677.  
 40.  Id. at 5 (citations omitted). 
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2014] THE ATS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE 431 
 
 
 
 
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION  
Two recent personal jurisdiction opinions by the Supreme Court
41
 have 
made it extremely difficult to get personal jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants in typical ATS suits, in which foreign defendants are sued for 
events that occurred outside the United States. Prior to these decisions, 
personal jurisdiction could be obtained over a defendant doing 
“continuous and systematic” business in a state even if the cause of action 
had no connection whatsoever with the state,
42
 a type of personal 
jurisdiction referred to as “general” jurisdiction. The Court’s decision in 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown
43
 limited general jurisdiction 
to those states in which the defendant was “essentially at home,” rather 
than to states in which the defendant did continuous and systematic 
business. We know from the opinion that a corporate defendant is at home, 
and so jurisdiction exists, in a state by which it is incorporated and the 
state where it has its principle place of business. Whether there are other 
states in which a corporate defendant is at home, such as the location of a 
foreign corporation’s only office in the United States, is an open question 
that will only be answered by later cases.
44
 
The Supreme Court recently supplied part of the answer to that 
question when it found a lack of personal jurisdiction in an ATS case in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.
45
 That case involved a suit by Argentine residents 
against DaimlerChrysler AG, a German corporation, in federal court in 
California for alleged human rights abuses that occurred in the 1970s 
while employed in Argentina by a subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler’s 
predecessor-in-interest. The complaint alleged that the Argentine 
subsidiary “collaborated with the Argentine government to kidnap, detain, 
torture, or kill [the plaintiffs] or their relatives during Argentina’s military 
regime of 1976 to 1983, known as the ‘Dirty War.’”46 The plaintiffs 
alleged that this conduct violated both the ATS and the Torture Victims 
Protection Act of 1991. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
jurisdiction in California because an indirect subsidiary of 
 
 
 41.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 42. John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1714–19 
(2013). 
 43. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 44.  See Drobak, supra note 42. 
 45. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 20, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 46.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, (No. 11-965) at 4 (internal 
quotations omitted).  
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DaimlerChrysler, which was incorporated in Delaware, distributes 
automobiles manufactured by DaimlerChrysler to dealerships in 
California.  
The Circuit Court ruled that the subsidiary “acted as Daimler’s agent 
for jurisdictional purposes and then [attributed the subsidiary’s] California 
contacts to Daimler.”47 In rejecting jurisdiction the Court wrote, “Even if 
we were to assume that [the subsidiary’s] contacts are imputable to 
Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject Daimler to general 
jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly 
render it at home there.”48 Rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to return to a 
pre-Goodyear standard of “substantial, continuous, and systematic course 
of business” in the forum state, the Court noted that neither Daimler nor its 
subsidiary “is incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its 
principal place of business there.”49 Although that conclusion could have 
been the end of the opinion, the Court turned to its opinion in Kiobel in the 
last section of its opinion. Noting that the “transnational context of this 
dispute bears attention,” the Court emphasized that comity and 
consideration of “international rapport” cautioned against the assumption 
of an expansive general jurisdiction not shared by the other nations.
50
 
The limitations on personal jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler will 
make it impossible to bring some types of ATS suits in the United States. 
This jurisdictional barrier is a serious impediment because the holdings of 
Goodyear and Daimler apply to suits in state court as well, since the limits 
on personal jurisdiction stem from the due process clause. However, the 
types of ATS suits possible under Justice Breyer’s formulation in his 
concurrence may also satisfy personal jurisdiction requirements.
51
  
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING RULES 
The ATS has no explicit statute of limitations. Between 1980 and 1991, 
courts looked to the statute of limitations for the closest analogous state 
torts.
52
 However, the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(“TVPA”) in 1991 “‘provide[d] a closer analogy than available state 
 
 
 47. Daimler, 571 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 758–59. 
 48. Id. at 759. 
 49. Id. at 750, 761. 
 50. Id. at 762–63. 
 51. See text accompanying infra note 66. 
 52.  See Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 550 (D.D.C. 1981) 
(“Unless a limitation is specifically provided by federal statute or treaty, a federal court must look to 
the limitations period of the district in which it sits and apply the most analogous statute.”). 
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statutes, and . . . a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial 
lawmaking.’”53 Every circuit to consider the issue since has applied the 
ten-year statute of limitation found in the TVPA to claims brought under 
the ATS.
54
 In addition, for cases filed after the enactment of the TVPA but 
concerning activity occurring before 1991, courts have applied the ten-
year statute of limitations retroactively.
55
  
In addition to providing an explicit statute of limitations, the legislative 
history of the TVPA contemplates the allowance of equitable tolling in 
appropriate circumstances.
56
 “The TVPA ‘calls for consideration of all 
equitable tolling principles in calculating [the statute of limitations] period 
with a view towards giving justice to plaintiff's rights.’”57 Because the 
TVPA allows for equitable tolling, courts have been asked to decide 
whether the ATS provides the same protection. Courts have decided 
unanimously that it does.
58
 The extraordinary circumstances required for 
 
 
 53.  Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Reed v. 
United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). 
 54.  See, e.g., Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“Although 
there is no express limitation period prescribed by the [ATS], the Ninth Circuit has held the applicable 
limitations period to be the 10-year period set out in the TVPA.”); Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 
492 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Like all courts that have decided this issue since the passage of the TVPA, we 
conclude that the ten-year limitations period applicable to claims under the TVPA likewise applies to 
claims made under the ATS.”). 
 55.  See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding retroactive 
application appropriate because “defendant had fair notice that torture was not a lawful act”); Cabello 
v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005). A few critics have rejected the ten-year 
statute of limitations and relied on customary international law in determining that a statute of 
limitations should not be implemented. Scholarly critique of the ten-year statute of limitations is based 
on the same idea that if courts are looking to international customary law for guidelines on other parts 
of the ATS, then courts should also look to the time limitations used in international law. To fill in the 
absence of a statute of limitations in the ATS, courts can look to international tribunals, which provide 
precedent and guidelines for time limits in international law. Tribunals that exclude time limitations 
from their statutes include: Nuremburg, Tokyo, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and United Nations tribunals established 
for Cambodia and East Timor. Also, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights have expressly upheld that atrocity crimes have no statute of limitations. Alka 
Pradhan, The Statute of Limitations for Alien Torts: A Reexamination After Kiobel. 21 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 229 (2011). However, these tribunals adjudicate criminal violations, where there is a 
stronger motive to bring war criminals and others responsible for crimes against humanity to justice, 
which justifies forgoing a time limit.  
 56.  See S. Rep. No. 102–249, at 10–11 (1991) (listing situations where equitable tolling would be 
appropriate, including when the “the defendant was absent from the United States . . . [and] where the 
defendant has concealed his or her whereabouts or the plaintiff has been unable to discover the identity 
of the offender.”). 
 57.  Chavez, 559 F.3d at 492 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102–249, at 10 (1991)). 
 58.  See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (allowing equitable tolling 
when delay caused by unavoidable extraordinary circumstances); Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1154–55 (“Our 
precedent has established that the TVPA’s and [ATS’s] statute of limitations can be equitably tolled.”); 
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equitable tolling are assessed on a case by case basis, but include 
“situations where the defendant misleads the plaintiff, allowing the 
statutory period to lapse; or when the plaintiff has no reasonable way of 
discovering the wrong perpetrated against her. . . .”59 Extraordinary 
circumstances have also been found when the political climate of a 
country made the safe initiation of a law suit impossible, although the 
plaintiff is required to file the lawsuit within a reasonable time after the 
extraordinary circumstances are removed.
60
  
It is likely that courts will continue to look to the TVPA for the statute 
of limitations and tolling rules in ATS cases. That will also make it harder 
to litigate some ATS claims. For example, in DaimlerChrysler, the 
atrocities underlying the suit occurred in the 1970s. Statutes of limitations 
serve two purposes: providing repose for the parties so that they may go 
on with their lives without the worry of an overhanging dispute and 
helping with the accuracy of litigation since memories lapse and records 
are lost with too long of a delay. We may not want to provide repose to 
those who commit atrocities, but aiding accuracy of judicial fact-finding is 
important. So statutes of limitations, with tolling rules, need to be applied 
in ATS cases. In the United States, torts often have a two-year statute of 
limitations, while contract suits commonly have a twelve-year limit. In 
context, ten years, with a few additional years for tolling if justified by the 
circumstances, seems reasonable for ATS suits. 
V. FORUM NON CONVENIENS, EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES, AND COMITY 
I believe that forum non conveniens should not be an issue in an ATS 
lawsuit. This common law doctrine should be displaced by a statute that 
deals with the choice of forum. For example, forum non conveniens is not 
granted by federal courts when another federal court is the more desirable 
forum. In that case, transfer to the other court is governed by the federal 
transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1404. As a result, the federal law of 
forum non conveniens has become only a vehicle for dismissing lawsuits 
that should be tried in another country, not in another part of the United 
 
 
Chavez, 559 F.3d at 492 (“[T]he justifications for the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling 
under the TVPA apply equally to claims brought under the ATS.”).  
 59. Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1154–55. In addition, courts usually require some evidence of deliberate 
misconduct to justify tolling the statutory period. Id. at 1155 (finding equitable tolling appropriate 
when plaintiffs, because of deliberate concealment by authorities, were unable to access proof of their 
claims).  
 60.  See Chavez, 559 F.3d at 494; Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1156 (“[T]he plaintiff should act with due 
diligence and file his or her action in a timely fashion in order for equitable tolling to apply.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ATS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE 435 
 
 
 
 
States.
61
 Congress has spoken about the desirability of permitting an ATS 
suit in the ATS statute itself, which should displace the common law 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. It is true that even though the alienage 
jurisdiction statute creates federal subject matter jurisdiction,
62
 courts 
nonetheless use forum non conveniens to dismiss those types of suits. 
However, the alienage jurisdiction state is a broad grant of jurisdiction that 
permits many different kinds of suits to be brought in federal court. On the 
other hand, the Alien Tort Statute is a narrow grant of federal court 
jurisdiction limited to civil actions “brought by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.” Given that Congress has opened the federal courts to this small set 
of cases, I think it would be inappropriate, perhaps even disrespectful of 
Congress, for a court to use forum non conveniens to avoid these kinds of 
cases. 
Notwithstanding the above analysis, many courts have used forum non 
conveniens to dismiss ATS suits.
63
 This appears to result from a concern 
over the litigation of issues with virtually no connection to the United 
States.
64
 In addition, a concern for the sovereignty of countries with 
 
 
 61. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft C. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1980).  
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2012). 
 63. See, e.g., In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 602 (E.D. Va. 2009); 
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Estate of 
Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Such limitations as . . . 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens are available in § 1350 cases as in any other.”). Some plaintiffs 
have argued that even though the ATS does not negate the use of forum non conveniens, it is an 
important factor weighing heavily in keeping the case. See Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 
1189, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Since this action is brought pursuant to United States case law and 
statutes, namely the [ATS] and the [TVPA], this Court has an interest in having the issues of law 
presented decided by a United States court.”); Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 
2d 736, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding although “the public interest in favor of domestic enforcement 
of federal laws is seldom determinative,” it is one factor to consider); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), overruled on other grounds by 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[Plaintiff’s] allegations include 
charges of genocide, war crimes, torture, and enslavement. These acts are universally condemned, and 
the United States has a strong interest in seeing violations of international law vindicated.”). The 
Second Circuit has held it reversible error for a district court to not consider these interests in 
analyzing forum non conveniens claims in ATS cases. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
226 F.3d 88, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We believe that, as a matter of law, in balancing the competing 
interests, the district court did not accord proper significance to . . . the policy interest implicit in our 
federal statutory law in providing a forum for adjudication of claims of violations of the law of 
nations.”); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (mentioning “Congress’s intent to 
provide a federal forum for aliens suing domestic entities for violation of the law of nations,” but 
leaving weighing of factors to district court on remand).  
 64.  In many cases, courts could not find a strong enough federal interest in adjudicating disputes 
between foreign parties, based on conduct which occurred in foreign countries. See, e.g., Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). Some courts 
also point out the importance of the forum non conveniens analysis for preventing United States courts 
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greater connections to the dispute and the parties has also played a role in 
the use of the doctrine. To me, the frequent use of forum non conveniens 
to dismiss ATS suits demonstrates a reluctance of federal judges to be 
involved with disputes that have so little connection with the United 
States. With the new territoriality requirement imposed on ATS suits by 
Kiobel, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is no longer necessary to 
assure adequate connections with the United States. The new territoriality 
requirement has taken the pressure off the courts to use forum non 
conveniens as a way to dismiss unrelated cases. It is appropriate that the 
Statute itself, and not forum non conveniens, should be the basis for the 
decision not to hear the suit. 
The Court’s opinion in Sosa indicated that exhaustion of remedies 
should play a role in ATS suits as appropriate. The Court wrote: 
[T]he European Commission argues as amicus curiae that basic 
principles of international law require that before asserting a claim 
in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies 
available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other forums 
such as international tribunals. . . . We would certainly consider this 
requirement in an appropriate case.
65
 
Justice Breyer in his concurrence in Kiobel (which was joined by three 
other Justices) noted with approval this new requirement of exhaustion of 
remedies, which is viewed as “consistent with those notions of comity that 
lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations.”66 To the 
extent that considerations of comity become part of the analysis, one of the 
considerations in forum non conveniens has remained alive, albeit as a 
stand-alone issue.  
Given the tenor of both Sosa and Kiobel, anyone bringing an ATS suit 
should be prepared to show an attempt to use the more appropriate 
tribunals or reasons for the impracticality of doing that. 
 
 
from being “reduced to international courts of claims.” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco 
Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 1985)). See also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 
F.3d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating doctrine of forum non conveniens is tool “to ensure that a trial 
court neither asserts jurisdiction over a case that lacks a significant connection with the forum, nor 
applies the law of a state with no interest in the matter”). 
 65.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 66.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013). Prior to Kiobel, courts 
were split on whether to read an exhaustion requirement into the ATS. Compare Jean v. Dorelien, 431 
F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he exhaustion requirement does not apply to the [ATS]”) with 
Enahoro v. Abubaker, 408 F.3d 877, 886 (7th Cir. 2005) (“It may be that a requirement for exhaustion 
is itself a basic principle of international law.”). 
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VI. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE  
A. The Law of Nations as Federal General Common Law  
Sosa stands for the proposition that the federal common law 
incorporates the law of nations. This principle extends beyond the use of 
customary international law in the Alien Tort Statute, although 
considerable controversy exists over the extent to which federal courts 
should do this.
67
  
In his concurrence in Sosa (joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Thomas), Justice Scalia argued that Erie and its progeny ended federal 
general common law and so no longer could federal courts look to 
customary international law. Thus, the Alien Tort Statute died with the 
death of federal general common law.
68
 The court rightly rejected this 
position in Sosa. I would like to add another reason for this rejection 
beyond what the Court wrote. 
Erie involved two separate issues, one statutory and the other 
constitutional. Neither has any bearing on the incorporation of customary 
international law into federal common law, especially for the ATS. The 
statutory issue is the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act’s mandate that 
“the laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of decisions in 
civil actions.”69 The determination in Erie that state law includes state 
common law has no bearing on an ATS claim, which does not involve 
state law. In addition, as the majority in Sosa pointed out, the Alien Tort 
Statute has remained essentially changed since its enactment in 1789. As 
the Court said,  
The First Congress, which reflected the understanding of the 
framing generation and included some of the Framers, assumed that 
federal courts could properly identify some international norms as 
enforceable in the exercise of [ATS] jurisdiction. We think it would 
be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have 
expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize 
international norms simply because the common law might lose 
some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.
70
 
 
 
 67.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal 
Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002). 
 68.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739–42. 
 69.  28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 70.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730–31. 
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The constitutional aspect of Erie involved federalism and state 
sovereignty, which has nothing to do with the Alien Tort Statute. The 
court in Erie was troubled by the federal courts applying federal general 
common law to non-federal disputes in diversity cases. The court 
considered that to be a usurpation of state authority by the federal courts. 
When federal courts apply the law of nations as part of federal common 
law, they do not infringe upon state rights. As a result, my view is that 
Erie is not relevant to the use of customary international law by the federal 
courts.
71
 
B. The Meaning of “Touch and Concern” and the Connections Necessary 
to Satisfy Kiobel 
It is somewhat strange that the Court in Kiobel would borrow a term 
from property law to describe the connections with the U.S. necessary to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. “Touch and 
concern” is a requirement needed to make covenants and equitable 
servitudes run with the land. From what I know about that requirement, I 
do not see any connection whatsoever between the property cases and the 
ATS. The running with the land cases are of no use in understanding the 
necessary ATS connections. Perhaps the Court used the term literally: 
aspects of the cause of action must “touch” the United States in some way 
and must also “concern” U.S. interests. However, to me, this does not add 
anything beyond a requirement that the cause of action must have a certain 
degree of connection with the United States. In some ways, it would be 
appropriate to view this touch and concern requirement as similar to the 
“minimum contacts” requirement for personal jurisdiction. Both are 
malleable terms that indicate the need for sufficient connections with the 
forum sovereign. It would also simplify the analysis because both the 
territoriality requirement and personal jurisdiction would be resolved the 
same way. Only time will tell, however, because we need to wait for new 
cases to flesh out the meaning of “touch and concern.” That leaves us with 
the job of lining up the cases that succeed and those that fail to achieve 
ATS jurisdiction and then comparing the kinds of contacts in both 
categories of cases. We do that already as a way to better understand the 
meaning of the minimum contacts requirement of personal jurisdiction, so 
 
 
 71.  It may be that a situation could develop in a diversity case, not an ATS case, in which the 
federal view of the meaning of customary international law differs from the state’s view. I suspect that 
at worst, this would bring us back to a regime like that of Swift’s, in which different interpretations 
applied in state and federal court.  
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perhaps “touch and concern” will become the equivalent of minimum 
contacts for ATS suits.  
I am persuaded by Justice Breyer’s formulation in his concurrence in 
Kiobel: “I would find jurisdiction under the statute where (1) the alleged 
tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or 
(3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an 
important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest 
in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil 
as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy of 
mankind.”72 He has three other justices with him on that opinion. The first 
two categories of cases seem to me to be straightforward instances of 
touch and concern. The third category is broad and gives more discretion 
to the judges. However, the safe harbor cases seem to me to clearly touch 
and concern the territory of the United States, so I hope that he could 
easily find a fifth Justice to join this position when the case arises. Beyond 
the safe harbor sub-class of cases, it will take future lawsuits to flesh out 
the meaning of the third criteria.
73
 
C. Exhaustion of Remedies and Comity  
Given the touch and concern requirement, the need to exhaust remedies 
will prove to be less important. I expect that once the touch and concern 
requirement is satisfied, the federal courts will be an appropriate place to 
litigate, minimizing the need to look for alternative forums. To the extent 
that it is relevant, courts could look to the exhaustion requirement in the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, just as they look to the statute of 
limitations in that act. The TVPA permits a court to decline to hear a case 
“if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the 
place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”74 The need 
to have adequate remedies will surely generate disputes over the adequacy 
of the alternative forum, like what transpires under a forum non 
conveniens motion for dismissal. There is also considerable discretion 
involved in the decision over whether alternative remedies have been 
exhausted. I think there is even great discretion involved in deciding 
 
 
 72.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013). 
 73. Even after the decision in Daimler v. Bauman, personal jurisdiction should not be a problem 
for the first two of Justice Breyer’s categories. Concerning the third category, personal jurisdiction will 
not be an issue in cases that deal with the capture in the United States of a “common enemy of 
mankind.” It might be a problem, however, for other types of ATS lawsuits that fit within his third 
category.  
 74.  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
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whether a U.S. court should dismiss a lawsuit for the sake of comity with 
another country. This discretion makes the likelihood of a U.S. forum 
more unpredictable, raising the stakes for lawyers trying to decide among 
alternative courts and various litigation strategies.
75
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
The limitations on the types of violations permitted by Sosa and the 
touch and concern requirement of Kiobel have together greatly limited the 
usefulness of the Alien Tort Statute for many types of cases brought over 
the past few decades. I will leave it up to the reader to judge whether that 
is good policy. Without a doubt, the Court has been hesitant to act without 
guidance from Congress. Perhaps some Congress in the not-too-distant 
future will tackle the problem of the proper scope of the Alien Tort Statute 
in a world very different from the one that existed in 1789. 
 
 
 75.  For an example of the issues that can arise from an attempt to enforce a foreign judgment, see 
Christopher A. Whytock, Some Cautionary Notes on the “Chevronization” of Transnational 
Litigation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 467 (2013).  
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